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This thesis examines the role of the legislative structure in explaining the growth
of federal government spending. The legislative structure of Congress is defined in
terms of the size, number, and partisanship of congressional committees and
subcommittees. An econometric model is used to correlate and assess archival data
from the years 1961 through 1984. Archival data is broken down by functional
expenditure area (dependent variable), by committees and subcommittees which
addressed specific functional areas, by the numbers of senators or representatives
sitting on the respective comm, ;ees and subcommittees, and by the averaged
Democratic proportion of the membership on the committees and subcommittees in
the corresponding functional area. The model estimates the effect of structural and
other, non-structural, variables (e.g. percentage change in unemployment and real
national income) on the percentage change in functional expenditures over time. This
thesis concludes that legislative structure plays a statistically insignificant role in
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Congressional legislative action or inaction is the means by which public and
private concerns become public policy.' The budget is the catalyst by which pubhc
policy is translated into governmental and public activity. This activity supports or is in
itself the essence of public policy. In a broad sense, the extent to which pubhc policy
reflects poUtical issues and concerns can be inferred from the proportion of the budget
allocated to functional areas, e.g. national defense, agriculture, and income security.
Aaron Wildavsky states that, among its other contexts, the federal budget "Taken as a
whole. ..is a representation in monetary terms of governmental activity." [Ref 1]
Revenue generation kept pace with budgetary outlays until the late 1950s when
federal deficits became routine (see Table 1).^ The continuing growth in annual federal
deficits was noted with particular concern by taxpayers because of the implications for
future tax increases and the growing national debt legacy being passed on to future
generations. These concerns led to pressure for control of and eventual reduction in
the federal deficit, resulting in the passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Bill in
1985. The relative ineffectiveness of this bill in 1986 gave rise to new concerns over
how to control federal spending and the imbalance in the budget.
B. OB.IECTIVES
The objectives of this thesis are to address those factors that may be significant
in explaining the recent rise in federal deficit spending and to determine whether
specific relationships exist which may be used in developing other measures for the
control of deficit spending. In particular, the thesis examines the role of the legislative
structure in explaining the growth of federal government spending.
^Consideration of some public concerns, e.g. the declaration of National Prayer
Day, and most private concerns, e.g. the receipt of an award or some form of
recognition, are generally disregarded in the consideration of legislative action because
they seldom alfect individuals, famihes, or organizations after the event and rarely
involve significant expenditures.
•^Includes outlays (and deficits) that are off-budget under current law and
proposed to be included on-budget. These transactions began in 1973.
TABLE 1
BUDGET RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS, 1951-1987
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Surplusb i
Fiscal Budget Budget Or
Year Receipts Outlavs Deficit (
1951 51,616 45.514 6,102
1952 66.167 67,686 -1,519
1953 69,608 76,101 -6,493
1954 68,701 70.855 -1,154
1955 65,451 68,444 -2.993
1956 74,587 70,640 3,947
1957 79,990 76,578 3,412
1958 79,636 82,405 -2.769
1959 79.249 92,098 -12,849
1960 92.492 92,245 247
1961 94,388 97,723 -3,335
1962 99,676 106,821 -7.146
1963 106.560 111.316 -4,756
1964 112,613 118,528 -5,915
1965 116,817 118,228 -1,411
1966 130,835 134,532 -3.698
1967 148,822 157,464 -8,643
1968 152,973 178,134 -25,161
1969 186,882 183,640 3,242
1970 192,812 195,649 -2,837
1971 187,139 210,172 -23,033
1972 207,309 230,681 -23,373
1973 230,799 245,707 -14,908
1974 263,224 269,359 -6,135
1975 279,090 332,332 -53,242
1976 298.060 371,779 -73,719
TQ'' 81.232 95,973 -14,747
1977 355,559 409,203 -53.644
1978 399,740 458,729 -58.989
1979 463.302 503,464 -40,161
1980 517,112 590,920 -73.808
1981 599.272 678,209 -78.936
1982 617,766 745,706 -127.940
1983 600,562 808,327 -207,764
1984 666.457 851,781 -185,324
1985 734.057 946,323 -212.266
1986 est 777,139 979,928 -202,789
1987 est 850,372 994,002 -143.630
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* In calendar year 1976, the Federal fiscal vear was converted from a Julv 1-June 30
basis to an Ocf. 1-Sept. iO basis. The TO refers to the transition quarter fro'm Julv 1 to
Sept. 30, 1976.
Note: Table data obtained from [Refs. 2,3].
C RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In line with the objectives above, the primar>' research question focuses on
whether a relationship exists between expenditure growth at the federal level and
changes in committee and subcommittee structure in the U. S. Congress. The
institutional structure of Congress will be defined in terms of the size, number, and
partisanship of congressional committees and subcommittees. Thus, the research will
address the questions of whether a membership change or change in the number of
committees or subcommittees responsible for a specific functional area has any bearing
on the overall grouih in federal expenditures. In addition, the research will examine
whether committee partisanship has any significant effect on spending.
Subsidiary questions include:
1. Does increased "specialization" (i.e. increasing the number of committees and
subcommittees addressing a specific functional area) lead to greater spending or
to better monitoring of agency activities, ceteris paribus?
2. Is the net effect of increased size of the committees and subcommittees:
a. reduced expenditures because of lower preferences of the median member,
or
b. increased expenditures because of greater ability to represent special
interest groups?
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
An econometric model is used to correlate and assess archival data from the
years 1961 through 1984. The analysis is limited to 12 functional expenditure
groupings, the corresponding structural variables, and to other potential explanatary
variables such as gross national product and unemployment.
Archival data was broken down by functional expenditure area, by conimittees
and subcommittees which addressed specific functional areas, by the numbers of
senators or representatives sitting on the respective committees and subcommittees,
and by the averaged Democratic proportion of the membership on the committees and
subcommittees in the corresponding functional area.
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E. ORGANIZATION
The thesis develops with a literature review and discussion (Chapter Two), which
provides the groundwork for model and data discussion (Chapter Three), subsequent
analysis of the model results (Chapter Four), and conclusions and summary remarks
(Chapter Five).
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
The literature review addresses five areas: (1) the structure of the legislative
process; (2) an analysis of the role of the legislator; (3) the party leaderships' control of
individual legislator's voting patterns through incentives (based on an analysis of final
voting on legislation); (4) a brief economic analysis of political decision making; and,
(5) a review of the efforts to curb pro-spending bias. The discussion that follows briefly
summarizes the literature and provides the framework for a structural analysis of the
legislative process.
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
I. The Legislative Process, An Institutionalized Environment
The legislative process is straightforward. A primary source of public bill
proposals is the executive branch, i.e. the President's State of the Union address and
agency proposals. The introduction or sponsoring of the bill must be by a House
member or by a Senator.
A bill is referred to the appropriate committee by a House parliamentarian on
the Speaker's order, or by the Senate president. Sponsors may indicate their
preferences for referral, although custom and chamber rule generally
govern. ...Failure of a committee to act on a bill is equivalent to kiUing it; the
measure can be withdrawn from the group's purview only by a discharge petition
signed by a majority of the House membership on House bills, or by adoption of
a special resolution in the Senate. Discharge attempts rarely succeed.. ..The
committee chairman may assign the bill to a subcommittee for study and
hearings, or it may be considered by the full committee. ...A subcommittee, after
considering a bill, reports to the full committee its recommendations for action
and any proposed amendments. The full committee then votes on its
recommendation to the House or Senate. ...When a committee sends a bill to the
chamber fioor, it explains its reasons in a written statement, called a report,
which accompanies the bill. ...Usually, the committee "marks up" or proposes
amendments to the bill. ...The chamber must approve, alter, or reject the
committee amendments before the bill itself can be put to a vote.^ [Ref 4: p. xxv]
^For a more complete discussion see [Refs. 5,6,7].
13
Once passed within one chamber, the bill is referred to the other chamber. Difierences
between the chambers regarding a specific bill are disposed of through compromise in
conference committees. When approved by both chambers, the bill is sent in its final
form to the President for signature into law. A Presidential veto requires a two-thirds
overriding vote within both chambers.
The legislative process is complicated by procedures, policies, and precedents
that have built up over time as expedient measures for handling bills of var>'ing
complexity and controversy. W. J. Oleszek comments.
Congressional procedures are employed to define, restrict, or expand the policy
options available to members during fioor debate. They may prevent
consideration of certain issues or presage policy outcomes.. ..such tightly
structured procedures enhance the policy influence of certain members,
committees, or party leaders; facilitate expeditious treatment of issues; grant
priority to some policy alternatives but not others; and determine, in general, the
overall character of policy decisions. [Ref 6: p. 9]
Procedural expertise within this institutionalized legislative environment has a
significant influence on political outcomes. Oleszek notes,
Members who know the rules will always have the potential to shape legislation
to their ends and to become key figures in coalitions trying to pass or defeat
legislation. ...Those who do not understand the rules reduce their proficiency and
influence as legislators. [Ref 6: p. 10]
2. Focus on the Legislator
Aaron Wildavsky provides some insightful discussion of the legislative process
in committee and subcommittee action [Ref 1]. The legislator faces the
institutionalized legislative environment within which he must learn to operate
proficiently and a voting framework characterized by various commitments that he
made to his constituency. He also faces a plethora of other factors which influence the
way he votes.
a. Budgetary Perspective
Budgetary perspective provides the framework which governs budgetary
impetus during legislative considerations. The substance of most legislation relies on
the budgetan,' backing provided. The determination of budgetary support (i.e. how
much, the extent to which it or parts or it are "fenced",'^ other restrictive verbage, the
To "fence
" in budgetarv' terms is to assign dollar limits, threshhold or ceiling, to
spending athorizations or appropriations.
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consideration of other functional area and/or national priorities, etc.) is strongly
influenced by the budgetary perspective of the individual legislator. Budgetary
perspective has significance in both the formulation and execution of legislation. Some
examples of perspective are:
• the economic perspective u'herein the budget acts as the "mechanism for making
choices among alternative expenditures' [Ref 1: p. 2] and provides a broad
national overview which may reject legislation on the grounds of greater
expenditure needs in other functional areas.
• the efficiency perspective wherein the budget seeks "the most policy returns for a
given sum of money" [Ref 1: p. 2] or the lowest cost to obtain desired
objectives. Because the legislator routinely addresses intra-functional area
concerns, policies, and objectives, this perspective tends to be parochially
biased. Although normally considered, national objectives and priority spending
considerations in a limited national resources environment are largely ignored.
• the socio-legal perspective wherein the budget becomes a contractual and
behavioral establishing link between financial resources and the human behavior
necessar>' to carr>' out public policy. The constraints of resource availability
and efficiency or effectiveness have no bearing.
Chairmen strongly influence their respective committees and subcommittees in their
consideration of legislation and its budgetary support. The direction each chairman
provides is imbued with his budgetary' perspective.
b. The Politicized Legislative Environment
PoUtical factors constrain the legislative process and alter the social infra-
structure. The social framework determines the role each legislator assumes as well as
the operative rules that govern his "membership" and activities.
All participants face the usual overt political factors involving group pressures,
relationships between Congressmen and their constituents, political party
conflicts, executive-legislative cooperation and rivalry, inter-agency disputes, and
the like. Sooner or later the participants go through a process of socialization in
the kinds of roles they are expected to play. They come to know the rules of the
budgetary game, which specify the kinds of moves that are and are not
permissible for them to make. [Ref 1: p. 6]
c. A Calculation Dilemma
After mastering his role and the rules of the budgetary game, the legislator faces the
two-fold problem that Wildavsky refers to as the calculation problem.^ The first aspect
^"By 'calculation' (he) means the series of related factors (manifestly including
perceptions of influence relationships) which the participants take into account in
determining the choice of competing alternatives. Calculation involves a study of how
problems arise, how they are identified as such, how they are broken down into
15
is that of the complexity of the issues faced within a bill or program, issues that
specialists in the field frequently do not agree on or adequately explain. The second
aspect is the difficulty of making value assessments, such as a return on the allocated
dollar (i.e. the efficiency perspective) or the potential contribution from each of the
areas competing for the same program or functional dollar (i.e. the economic
perspective).
Aside from the complexity of individual budgetary programs, there remains the
imposing problem of making comparisons among different programs that have
different values for dilTerent people [Ref 1: p. 10].
Wildavsky suggests that legislators use four aids to calculation in dealing with complex
or particularly large problems:
1. The experiential approach starts with a rough best estimate to work with while
experience accumulates. .Modifications are then made as difficulties are
encountered or as growing experience dictates (examples of this approach are
the Korean war build-up and various disaster relief programs).
2. The process of simplification wherein complexity is handled by use of simpler
items or actions as surrogate indices. Wildavsky notes that the validity of such
abdication on complex issues rests in the use of the surrogates as a "testing
device, (when) and if there is a reasonable connection between the competence
shown in handling simple and complex items. "^ [Ref. 1: p. 12]
3. The concept of satisficing (satisfy and sulTice) wherein one lowers expectations
from the best of all possible worlds to that which is merely sufficient to meet
the lowest thresholds of accomplishment. One need not and, in fact, can not
achieve all things with style in a limited resources environment. It is merely
enough to "get by" or "make do" so that more program needs can be met.
4. The concept of incremental budgeting wherein "...the largest determining factor
oi' the size and content of this year's budget is last years budget. Most of the
budget is the product of previous decisions.... (The budget) is almost never
actively reviewed as a whole ever\' year in the sense of reconsidering the value
of all existing programs as compared to all possible alternatives.. ..the men who
make the budget are concerned with relatively small increments to an existing
base."^ [Ref. 1: pp. 13,15]
manageable dimensions, how they are related to one another, how determinations are
made of what is relevant, and how the actions of others are given consideration."
[Ref. 1; p. 7]
'^A related method is to examine the performance and knowledge of responsible
administrative oHicials. If the responsible olTicials are knowledgeable and poised in
responding to questions in any area of their program, it is reasonable to assume that
the program is not out of control. Even a subjective measure of a program's efiiciency
and effectiveness can be answered, if not quantified, to some extent.
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In addition to an established base, an agency can expect to receive a "fair share" of any
budget increase or decrease that is made in a given year. The legislator has little time
for an intensive review of an agency's complete budget when the complexity of issues
and the effort to assess the relative value both within and among programs consumes
so much of his time and energy.
3. Partisanship and the Legislator (Incentives and Penalties)
Mark Grain, Donald R. Leavens, and Robert D. ToUison {hereafter refered to
as CLT) look at the "role of floor voting from the standpoint of legislator organization
and control." [Ref 8: p. 833] They look at the timing and sequence of fmal votes as a
measure of ease of passage and of incentive (reward). The more senior and party-
oriented legislators are rewarded with earlier consideration of their bills and with less
political friction. CLT touch on other research that has
focused on the relative impact of economic vs. ideological influences on
congressional voting behavior (wherein) the way that legislators vote on
proposed legislation is modeled as a function of the preferences of various
economic and ideological interests groups, including the legislator's own
preferences for wealth and ideology. (CLT fault the the research for ignoring the
fact that legislatures, as a whole, are) costly and imperfect organizations for
generating political influences. [Ref. 8: p. 833J
The shortcomings noted in this research can be partially explained in the development
of the role and social infrastructure previously noted in Wildavsky's work. Where CLT
fall short in dismissing this research on the relative impact of economic vs. ideological
influences is in the assumption that special interest groups must address a large
proportion of the legislatures to be effective in gernerating political influence. Securing
the political influence of a majority in the respective subcommittees and committees
that address specific legislation may be sufficient to eflect full legislation or an
amendment to a non-related but heavily favored bill. Legislatures may be imperfect
organizations for generating widespread political influence, but successful lobbying may
require only that one influence a subcommittee chairman.
As a product of previous decisions, "...the base is the general expectation among
the participants that programs will be carried on at close to the going level of
expenditures but it does not necessarily include all activities. Having a project included
in the agency's base thus means more than just getting it in the budget for a particular
year. It means establishing the expectation that the expenditure will continue, that it is
accepted as part of what will be done, and therefore, that it will not normally be
subjected to intensive scrutiny." [Ref I: p. 17]
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Team production principles and the party loyalty filtering process are inherent
in the nature of collective decision making.
Deals are negotiated during the legislative session among legislators, the
leadership, and interest groups. Once it is clear that these "markets" have cleared,
the leadership must arrange final votes to consummate each deal [Ref. 8: p. 834J.
A legislators credibility with his party influences both the timing of the vote on his bill
and the probable success of its passage. Party credibility is lost when a legislator
'reneges' on negotiated deals; for example, changing his vote from what was agreed or
departing the "HiU" after the vote on his bill, but before votes on subsequent bills.
Party leadership encourages party line compliance and deal negotiation and discourages
reneging' by rewarding within the committee system and through the recognition of
seniority. The primar>' incentives used are assignments to superior committee positions
and the assurance of earlier and more certain passage of sponsored bills. "The
legislature will be a more elTective organization the more closely rewards are tailored to
individual legislator productivity^ [Ref 8: p. 834]." Party leadership has incentivized the
legislative process in their efTorts to control and organize party legislators.
CLT touch on three other theories which warrant attention:
1. The political power theory hypothesizes the same earlier and easier passage of a
party supporter's bills, but the emphasis is on the more "powerful" legislator
rather than on an incentive structure. Its shortcoming is the simultaneity
problem, from whence the "power" arises.
2. The legislative capital framework focuses on the accumulation of political
capital. Such capital is generated by legislative competence which, in turn is
related to seniority. The combination leads to earlier and easier passage of the
legislators bills. Again the simultaneity problem arises between the
accumulation of pohtical capital and the development of legislative competence,
which together lead to reelection and greater seniority.
3. The bargaining power theory reverses the sequence of bill consideration. It
suggests that "returns are greatest by waiting the longest, and if this is so, the
bills of the most senior and powerful legislators should be voted on last."
[Ref 8: p. 835] This argues for an ineffective process, since all bills cannot be
considered and passed at the end.
The bargaining power theory is the weakest of the theories presented. CLT conclude
that reward structure and seniority recognition are critical elements in party
leaderships control of individual legislators.
CLT define individual legislator productivity as "the propensity of a legislator to
keep his political bargains." [Ref 8: p. 834]
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4. An Economic Analysis Approach
Glahe and Lee [Ref. 9| draw some interesting conclusions in their chapter on
economic analysis:
• Political behavior is motivated largely by self-interest. Politicians are motivated
to act on voting behavior information because of the potential impact of voters'
behavior on their reelections. The more distant their positions are from that of
the median voter, the more likely a political opponent's position falls between
their's and the median voters', and the more likely they are to fail to be
reelected.
• Efficient political decisions require much more information than market
decisions because many more people may be affected, not just the ^q\v
individuals involved in a market decision. When more people are atlected,
information on "consumers' choice" is much more difficult and costly to obtain.
The consequence of reduced information and its high cost is a large number of
inefficient political decisions.
• Voter apathy occurs because "there is little connection between the political
decisions individual voters make and the political actions that are actually
executed." [Ref. 9: p. 542] The voter's cost of being politically informed is far
greater than the expected return on his voting decision.
• Special-interest groups form when political issues motivate individuals to
become poUtically informed and active. Although a small minority of the voting
public, these groups can exert sufficient influence to have legislation passed that
will benefit them at the expense of the majority, "...much political action is
motivated by the opportunity the political process provides for one group to
create and take advantage of a negative externality (i.e. the imposition of an
uncompensated cost on other groups). Activities that generate negative
externalities in political markets, as in private markets, tend to be excessively
funded." [Ref 9: p. 542]
In a final parting shot, the authors state:
Political decision making will generally be less responsive to voters than market
decision making will be to consumers. The result is that negative externalities
(which often cause market failure) almost always accompany political action.
These politically generated externahties not only cause inefficiencies, but they
also explain the motivation behind much political action. The opportunity that
the political process affords to special-interest groups to reap rewards by
imposing uncompensated costs on the general public is a common feature of
pohtics and nearly always leads to inefficiencies. [Ref. 9: p. 544]
5. In Pursuit of Fiscal Responsibility
General disgust with the blatant use of legislative action and non-legislative
maneuvering in the pursuit of individual goals was a major impetus in the passage of
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the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act (Public Law 93-344) in 1974. At the
time, there were no restraints on voting for spending and few were willing to vote for
corresponding tax increases to cover the spending. When legislators could not gain
their spending ends through the appropriations committees, they resorted to "off-
budget" spending, i.e.
direct drafts on the Treasur>' ("backdoor spending"),. ..(end-runs) through tax
expenditures (spending that allows certain people to reduce their taxes before
these taxes get to the Treasur\),... loans and loan guarantees, which, except for
defaults, do not count in the budget as direct spending. Individual members of
Congress won but Congress as a whole lost; individual and collective rationality
were at odds. [Ref 1: p. 223]
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, inter alia, did much
in subsequent years to control the rampant off-budget spending that was typical of
prior years. It did not, however, address the more significant problem of the lack of
restraints on voting for spending which was in excess of an amount indexed to the
percent of gromh in GNP. Political repercussion is critical when a proposed increase in
a functional area is greater than the respective proportion of an aggregate increase
indexed to the percent of GNP growth in the previous year. An example of political
repercussion may be the requirement to offset an approved (voted in) authorization or
appropriation that exceeds the budget approved in the First Resolution with an
equivalent reduction elsewhere within the budget. This example could be modified to
require an offset greater by a predetermined percentage to be applied directly toward
annual deficit or national debt reduction.
Despite the restraints of the 1974 control act, expenditure growth continued to
generate annual deficits. Wildavsky notes:
two seemingly automatic processes (that have encouraged this growih in federal
spending): revenues under a progressive income tax rise faster than inflation,
while important transfer programs, such as Social Security, index benefits to the
price level. The seemingly natural rise in revenues frees Congressmen from
voting for tax increases to fund spending growth. Indexing of benefits helps
ensure that recipients maintain their share of total product. [Ref I: p. 253]
Until the personal income tax structure became indexed to inflation in 1985 as a result
of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 [Ref 10: pp. 118-120], progressive tax
creep increased national revenues without the need for congressional intervention to
fund spending sprees. Restrictions on the indexing of benefits tend to be viewed as
20
confiscations of rightful benefits and result in rapidly mobilized minority voting
response paralyzing the legislators and the proposed legislation. The net effect of




The legislative process is not functioning as it was initially conceived, because
it has been subjected to;
• the abuse of legislators, who have institutionalized, politicized, and incentivized
their environment,
• the misuse of special interest groups, who extort the advantages of negative
externalities from vote conscious politicians, and
• the neglect of the vast majority of voters, who abdicate political responsibiUty
because of the "excessive" cost of involvement.
The complexity of issues and the difficulties associated with making relative
value assessments within programs, among many programs, and across functional areas
seriously degrade the ability of the legislature to function as a cost-efTective mechanism
for transforming pubUc and private interests into public poUcy. Lawmaking is the basic
response to the entire range of national concerns. It is essential to revenue generation
and expenditure and the catalyst for all government activity.
When a bill does not pass or is tabled, it can be thought of as resulting from a
contractual breakdown of some sort in the legislative marketplace. The sponsor
and other supporters of a bill may have engaged in reneging or other
noncooperative behavior in carr>"ing through on their commitments. The
leadership needs to limit such behavior, and one way to discipline reneging is to
refuse to call up a member's bill for a final vote or not to support such bills when
the floor vote is held. In other words, when shirking takes place, payoffs are
withheld by not passing a member's bill. [Ref 8: p. 838]
Special-interest groups become winners at the expense of the majority. Legislation
introduced on their behalf tends to be excessively funded and inefficient. Politicians
recognize that during reelections, special-interest groups are long in memor\' and
politically potent because of their organization. The majority, on the other hand, is
short on memory* and tends to be apathetic because of the relatively low cost to the
individual of any given piece of special-interest legislation.
See discussion in paragraph B of this chapter.
21
2. Specialization
The Congressional structure uses the committee/ subcommittee system to focus
on difTerent aspects of required government activity. The control of this activity lies in
the budget and the legislation that authorizes and appropriates the expenditures in the
aggregated functional areas. Although in general, one committee has primary
responsibility for legislation in a specific functional area, considerable overlap exists as
legislation in any one area often has ramifications in other areas. For example,
legislation within the functional area "agriculture" may have far reaching consequences
in the functional areas of "international relations" and "health".
As the complexity of the environment increases, the potential for good and
adverse impacts in numerous areas grows. The committee and subcommittee system
permits increased attention by legislators on a wider variety and scale of legislation.
This specialization has forced legislators to increase their reUance on each other and on
the legislation proposed by their respective committees and subcommittees. No one
legislator has the time, stamina, or mental capacity to assimilate the information
processed by more than one or two committees and their subcommittees in the
consideration of various legislation.
Wildavsky [Ref 1: p. 225], argues that increased specialization leads to better
monitoring of the dollar appropriation and of its past use within ongoing programs. He
concludes that an increase in the number and size of committees and subcommittees is
therefore desirable. Having reached the limits of the legislators' capacity to assimilate
the complexity of the legislative environment, and given the current level of
specialization and Wildavsky's incremental budgeting argument, ^^ we may have reached
a point of diminishing benefits from increased specialization. Specialization is an
attempt to reduce the calculation dilemma and the complexity issue, but it does not
address the party incentive program for controlling and organizing party legislators, the
impact of personal goals, and the demands of constituents. Those areas that
specialization does not consider are the areas which tend to override economic
considerations during a vote.
Wildavsky and others have argued that specialization is the key to knowledge
and knowledge is the key to power (see [Ref 1: p. 225] ). While specialization does
increase knowledge and knowledge does make for a more informed choice in the
decision process, it is not clear that power is derived therefrom. It would seem more
Wherein the current year "base" is rarely reviewed and only the proposed
expenditure increases above the base are looked at in depth.
likely that power derives, at least initially, simply from the authority that comes from
membership on the committee or subcommittee.
3. The Median Demander Paradox
If the legislative process were not institutionalized, politicized, and incentivized
as discussed earlier, all legislators could aspire to any committee or subcommittee with
a reasonable hope of serving in the desired capacity. Knowledgeability, personal
preference, the needs of constituency and the national good would be primary
motivaters in the selection of committees on which to indicate a desire to serve. Within
this frame of reference, a model, without CLT's control incentives and seniority
recognition, would suggest that the highest demanders would be the most aggressive
and successful in pursuing the different committee and subcommittee positions.
Because the highest median demanders would serve on the various committees and
subcommittees, the model would hypothesize greater expenditures than when
assignments are arbitrary or are made on the basis of some incentive system where the
relative power of position overrides national economic considerations and the real
needs of the constituents.
Advocates of increased specialization counter the highest median demander
problem by increasing the members on the committees and subcommittees and thereby
reducing the median demand, moderating expenditures, and improving the monitoring
of expenditures for effectiveness. However, increasing the membership also increases
the representation of culturally distinct and geographically dispersed constituencies.
What is good for one part of the country may not be good for another without a
considerable increase in expenditures or an offseting commitment for expenditures in
another functional area. Increasing membership also provides broader access^ ^ to
influential membership by special interest groups. The result may very well be a net
increase in expenditures with an increase in specialization.
D. SUMMARY
The Uterature reviewed addresses the legislative process from the individual
politician's perspective, from that of party leadership control initiatives, and from the
role of special-interest groups in the formulation of inefficient political decisions. The
^^Ease of access for greater periods of time results when more legislators are
available for lobbying purposes. Because more members with influence in specific areas
are targotable, the potential for successful lobbying is greatly improved. Eventually, the
number of lobbyists may increase as access becomes easier.
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discussion addressed the issues of specialization and median demand within the
congressional structure. This thesis looks at the effects on the process by the structure
that uses it. The structural areas considered, which may have an impact on the
process, include:
• changes over time in the number and political makeup of the committees and
subcommittees which address the individual functional spending areas
• changes over time in the number of members on the committees and
subcommittees which address the individual functional spending areas.
If structural aspects can be shown to have statistically significant bias toward increased
spending, modification of these aspects can then be considered in the effort to control
deficit spending.
III. THE MODEL AND THE DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter One briefly addressed the scope and methodology involved in the
development of the econometric model. This chapter presents the model, discusses the
variables and sources of the data, addresses the expected signs and rationale for the
expected eflects of the independent variables on the dependent variable, and notes
some limitations of the data.
B. THE MODEL
The model estimates the effect of structural and other variables on the percentage
change in functional expenditures over time. Because each session consists of two
fiscal years, data for each session were averaged for the two-year period. The data
begin with session 86 (years 1959-1960) for the percentage changes in expenditures,
unemployment rate, and real national income, and with session 87 (years 1961-1962)
for the remaining variables. Session 98 (years 1983-1984) is the last of the 12 sessions
included in the data.
The estimating model is specified as follows:
%AGj^j = /(%AU,%AI,PA,PS,L,Hc,Sc,Hsc,Ssc,Hcm,Scm, (eqn 3.1)
Hscm,Sscm,Hd,Sd,Hcd,Scd,Hscd,Sscd}
where:
%AG^j percentage change in expenditure in functional area x during session i
%AU percentage change in the unemployment rate for session i
%AI percentage change in the real national income for session i
PA Presidential affiliation during session i (= if Republican, = I if
Democrat)
PS Presidential success rate during the session i (percentage of presidential
victories on congressional votes where the president took a clear-cut stand)
L the number of public laws passed during session i
He the number of House committees in functional area x during session i
Sc the number of Senate committees in functional area x during session i
Hsc the number o[ House subcommittees in functional area x during session i
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Ssc the number of Senate subcommittees in functional area x during session i
Hem the number of members of House committees in functional area x during
session i
Scm the number of members of Senate committees in functional area x during
session i
Hscm the number of members oC House subcommittees in functional area x
during session i
Sscm the number of members of Senate subcommittees in functional area x
during session i
Hd the Democratic percentage for the full House during session i
Sd the Democratic percentage for the full Senate during session i
Hcd the Democratic percentage of House committees in functional area x during
session i
Scd the Democratic percentage of Senate committees in functional area x
during session i
Hscd the Democratic percentage of House subcommittees in functional area x
during session i
Sscd the Democratic percentage of Senate subcommittees in functional area x
during session i
C. THE DATA
1. The Dependent Variable (%AG )
In selecting the dependent variable, the use of actual expenditures rather than
authorizations or appropriations better reflects the fmal intent and mandate of
Congress for a specified session. Actual expenditures represent the result of all actions
taken by those respective committees and subcommittees involved. In keeping with the
requirement of the Congressional Budget Act to "display all programs according to the
principal national need that they are intended to serve" [Ref 13: p. 8], the Historical
Tables [Ref 11: Section 3-1] provide a functional framework for grouping expenditures
which would otherwise be unmanageable. The functional framework and grouping
process applied across the years provides continuity. The functional expenditure data
are adjusted for inflation using 1982 as the base year. Table 2 displays data on
expenditure levels and percent changes for each of the functional areas of the data
base. The percent change for each functional area was calculated using the formula:
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The historical tables provide some pertinent notes regarding the functional expenditure
data.
In arraying data on a functional basis, budget authority and outlays are classified
according to the primary purpose of the activity. To the extent feasible, this
classification is made without regard to agency or organizational
distinctions. ..The general rule underlying all of these tables is to provide data in
as meaningful and comparable a fashion as is possible. The data are always
presented on a basis consistent with current budget concepts. Insofar as is
possible such changes are made for all years. [Ref II: Section 3-1, Intro 1-3]
2. Structural Variables
Structural variables are those variables that address the institutional structure
of Congress. Ihey are defined in terms of the size, number, and makeup of
Congressional committees and subcommittees. The variables for each functional area
are extracted from [Refs. 14,15], and presented in Table 3. They consist of:
• the number of committees and their subcommittees uithin both chambers that
had, within their charter or title, responsibilities pertaining to the consideration
of the same functional area. Some expenditure areas were addressed by the full
committee only, while others had different aspects addressed by a number of
subcommittees within the same committee.
• the corresponding membership of the responsible committees and
subcommittees.
• the political makeup of the responsible committees and subcommittees.
3. Other Variables
In order to provide a broader base for analysis, several non-structural
variables were also incorporated into the specification. The data for these variables are
presented in Table 4 and consist of:
• real national income [Ref 18: p. 205], which was adjusted for inflation using
1982 as the base year, and from which the percent change between sessions was
calculated using a general version of equation (3.2) above.
• unemployment [Ref 18: pp. 181.240], from which the percent change between
sessions was calculated using a general version of equation (3.2) above.
• a dummy variable for presidential afTiliation.
• the presidential success rate [Ref 15: p. 19-c] on congressional votes where the
president took a clearcut stand. ^^
^
"Based on Congressional Quarterly's ground rules and analysis. Three criteria are
worth special note: first, "VIembers (of Congress) must be aware of the position when
the vote is taken. ..(second.) All presidential-issue votes have equal statistical weight in
the analysis... (and third,) Presidential support is determined by the position of the
TABLE 3
STRUCTURAL VARIABLES BY FUNCTIONAL AREA
SESSIONS 87-98
NATIONAL DEFENSE
Sess He Sc Hcd Scd Hse Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Sem Hsem Sscm Cc (:c' Csc Csc'
87 56.8 64.7 6.0 6.0 58.1 62.9 37.0 17.0 9.1 4.6 2 4 12.0 144.00
88 56.8 70.6 6.0 5.0 62.1 66.6 57.0 17.0 9.8 4.6 2 4 11.0 121.00
89 67.6 70.6 11.0 5.0 64.6 65.0 57.0 17.0 8.1 5.3 2 2 16.0 256.00
90 : 57.5 66.7 16.5 5.0 58.1 65.8 40.0 18.0 7.9 6.4 2 4 21.5 462.25
91 ] 57.5 55.6 18.0 5.0 56.7 58.5 40.0 18.0 7.6 7.2 2 4 23.0 529.00
92 ] 61.0 56.3 10.5 12.5 59.6 57.5 41.0 16.0 8.5 6.1 2 4 25.0 529.00
95 : 56.3 60.0 8.0 12.0 58.7 59.9 45.5 15.0 9.9 6.3 2 4 20.0 400.00
94 ] 67.5 62.5 7.0 9.0 69.4 59.8 40.0 16.0 12.1 7.3 2 4 16.0 256.00
95 ] 67.5 61.1 7.0 8.0 68.8 61.4 40.0 18.0 12.9 6.8 2 4 15.0 225.00
96 ] 64.8 58.8 8.0 6.0 64.1 56.4 44.0 17.0 12.5 8.0 2 4 14.0 196.00
97 ] 57.5 47.1 7.0 6.0 57.1 44.8 44.5 17.0 13.7 7.3 2 4 13.0 169.00
98 : 64.4 44.4 7.0 6.0 64.7 45.8 45.0 18.0 15.7 8.9 2 4 15.0 169.00
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Sess He Se Hed Sed Hse Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Sem Hsem Sscm Cc :c2 Csc CSC^
87 : 60.0 63.4 8.0 15.0 58.7 60.8 55.0 15.0 8.8 6.2 2 4 23.0 529.00
88 ] 60.0 66.7 6.0 14.0 59.7 65.9 55.0 15.0 9.0 6.3 2 4 20.0 400.00
89 ] 68.6 68.8 7.0 14.5 65.5 66.2 35.0 16.0 9.7 6.4 2 4 21.5 462.25
90 ] 57.1 68.8 8.0 16.0 56.9 67.0 35.0 16.0 8.6 6.3 2 4 24.0 576.00
91 ] 57.1 58.8 7.0 15.0 55.5 64.9 35.0 17.0 9.6 6.5 2 4 22.0 484.00
92 ] 57.9 56.3 5.0 15.0 59.2 59.1 58.0 16.0 9.5 7.1 2 4 20.0 400.00
93 ] 55.5 56.3 7.0 16.0 56.2 60.2 58.0 16.0 9.1 7.0 2 4 23.0 529.00
94 ] 67.2 60.0 7.0 15.0 71.1 60.2 34.0 15.0 7.9 7.0 2 4 22.0 484.00
95 ] 67.6 64.7 7.0 10.0 70.9 65.4 34.0 17.0 7.4 5.1 2 4 17.0 289.00
96 ] 64.5 58.8 7.0 7.0 66.7 59.5 31.0 17.0 9.4 6.9 2 4 14.0 196.00
97 ] 57.1 50.0 7.0 9.0 57.5 41.7 28.0 18.0 7.7 4.9 2 4 16.0 256.00
98 ] 64.5 44.4 7.0 9.0 62.2 39.9 31.0 18.0 9.6 5.6 2 4 16.0 256.00
VETERANS' BENEFITS AND SERVICES
Sass He Sc Hed Sed Hse Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Sem Hsem Sscm (:c Cc2 Csc Csc^
87 ]L 2 60.0 65.7 6.0 1.0 56.5 60.0 25.0 16.0 7.5 5.0 3 9 7.0 49.00
88 ]L 2 60.0 65.7 6.0 1.0 59.5 60.0 25.0 16.0 7.5 5.0 5 9 7.0 49.00
89 ]L 2 68.0 65.2 5.0 1.0 65.4 66.7 25.0 16.5 11.5 6.0 5 9 6.0 36.00
90 ]L 2 56.0 65.6 5.0 1.0 54.9 62.5 25.0 16.5 11.0 8.0 5 9 6.0 36.00
91 ]L 2 58.0 58.8 5.0 1.0 55.9 58.8 25.0 17.0 11.4 8.5 5 9 6.0 56.00
92 ] 61.5 55.6 5.0 4.0 52.2 60.0 26.0 9.0 10.4 5.0 2 4 9.0 81.00
95 ] 57.7 55.6 5.0 4.0 55.1 60.0 26.0 9.0 13.8 5.0 2 4 9.0 81.00
94 ] 67.9 61.2 5.0 4.5 70.4 63.4 28.0 9.0 12.5 5.5 2 4 9.5 90.25
95 ] 67.9 66.7 5.0 5.0 70.2 66.7 28.0 9.0 12.4 6.0 2 4 8.0 64.00
96 ] 65.6 60.0 5.0 0.0 65.9 0.0 32.0 10.0 14.0 0.0 2 4 5.0 25.00
97 ] 55.4 41.7 5.0 0.0 55.7 0.0 33.0 12.0 12.8 0.0 2 4 5.0 25.00
98 ] 63.6 41.7 5.0 0.0 64.6 0.0 33.0 12.0 12.4 0.0 2 4 5.0 25.00
EDUCATION, TRAINING, EMPLOYMENT, AND SOCIAL SERVICES
Sess He Se Hed Scd Hse Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Sem Hsem Sscm (:c Cc^ Csc Csc^
87 ] 61.3 66.7 7.0 7.0 56.2 64.2 31.0 15.0 6.9 6.4 2 4 14.0 196.00
88 ] 61.3 66.7 6.0 7.0 60.7 64.2 51.0 15.0 9.1 6.5 2 4 13.0 169.00
89 : 67.7 65.7 9.0 7.5 65.6 66.4 51.0 16.0 8.9 7.8 2 4 16.5 272.25
90 ] 57.6 62.5 6.0 8.0 57.5 65.5 55.0 16.0 13.3 7.7 2 4 14.0 196.00
91 ] 57.1 58.8 6.0 10.5 56.4 58.1 35.0 17.0 14.5 9.4 2 4 16.5 272.25
92 ] 57.9 58.8 7.5 14.5 60.9 59.1 38.0 17.0 14.6 9.0 2 4 22.0 484.00
93 ] 57.9 62.5 8.0 12.5 62.5 63.4 38.0 16.0 11.6 9.7 2 4 20.5 420.25
94 ] 67.1 61.5 8.0 11.0 68.9 62.2 39.5 15.5 12.7 10.7 2 4 19.0 361.00
95 ] 67.6 60.0 8.0 8.0 66.4 60.9 37.0 15.0 12.1 5.6 2 4 16.0 256.00
96 ] 64.4 60.0 9.0 7.0 69.1 59.9 56.5 15.0 12.3 6.4 2 4 16.0 256.00
97 ] 58.2 43.8 8.0 7.0 61.2 40.5 55.5 16.0 10.1 6.6 2 4 15.0 225.00
98 ] 64.8 44.4 8.0 7,0 65.7 41.4 54.0 18.0 11.4 8.2 2 4 15.0 225.00
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TABLE 3
STRUCTURAL VARIABLES BY FUNCTIONAL AREA
SESSIONS 87-98 (CONT D.)
AGRICULTURE
Sess He 5c Hcd Scd Hsc Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Scffl Hscffl 'Ssem Cc Cc2 Csc Csc2
87 60.0 64.7 14.0 4.0 61.5 59.9 35.0 17.0 10.7 7.5 2 4 18.0 324.00
88 60.0 64.7 15.0 5.0 60.9 63.1 35.0 17.0 10.7 7.0 2 4 20.0 400.00
89 68.6 66.7 15.0 5.0 66.2 63.4 35.0 15.0 9.8 6.6 2 4 20.0 400.00
90 57.1 66.7 15.0 5.0 57.6 61.5 35.0 15.0 7.6 6.3 2 4 20.0 400.00
91 55.2 53.8 10.0 5.0 57.6 59.3 33.5 13.0 7.8 6.2 2 4 15.0 225.00
92 62.0 57.1 10.0 6.0 62.5 57.8 35.5 14.0 8.8 6.7 2 4 16.0 256.00
93 55.6 53.8 10.0 6.0 55.6 57.4 36.0 13.0 9.9 7.0 2 4 16.0 256.00
9<+ 66.3 64.3 10.0 6.0 71.3 62.6 54.0 14.0 11.3 8.2 2 4 16.0 256.00
95 67. < 61.1 10.0 7.0 72.5 60.9 46.0 18.0 12.2 7.4 2 4 17.0 289.00
96 6'+.3 55.6 10.0 7.0 68.8 55.2 42.0 18.0 10.7 7.7 2 4 17.0 289.00
97 2 56.7 47.1 9.0 8.0 58.3 39.8 41.5 17.0 13.9 7.0 3 9 17.0 289.00
98 2 63.4 44.4 9.0 7.0 66.7 40.9 41.0 18.0 12.6 7.3 3 9 16.0 256.00
GENERAL SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
Sess He 5c Hcd Scd Hsc Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Sem Hsem Ssem Cc Ce^ Csc Csc^
87 2 2 60.5 65.6 5.0 0.0 59.6 0.0 29.8 16.0 9.4 0.0 4 16 5.0 25.00
88 2 2 59.4 68.8 4.0 0.0 59.3 0.0 32.0 16.0 13.5 0.0 4 16 4.0 16.00
89 2 2 67.2 68.6 6.0 0.0 66.5 0.0 33.5 17.5 14.4 0.0 4 16 6.0 36.00
90 2 2 58.2 62.9 6.0 0.0 57.9 0.0 33.5 17.5 16.4 0.0 4 16 6.0 36.00
91 2 2 55.7 60.0 6.5 0.0 56.1 0.0 35.0 15.0 17.3 0.0 4 16 6.5 42.25
92 2 2 57.0 55.6 7.0 0.0 59.8 0.0 33.8 13.5 15.6 0.0 4 16 7.0 49.00
95 2 3 55.7 58.3 7.0 2.0 56.8 63.6 35.0 16.0 20.5 5.5 5 25 9.0 81.00
9<+ 2 3 67.4 62.6 8.0 2.0 67.8 60.7 36.0 15.2 19.5 14.0 5 25 10.0 100.00
95 2 2 67.5 61.2 8.0 2.0 67.7 62.5 38.5 16.8 19.8 8.0 4 16 10.0 100.00
96 2 3 64.5 59.6 8.0 3.0 64.2 61.5 38.0 15.7 17.8 8.7 5 25 11.0 121.00
97 2 2 57.1 47.1 8.0 2.0 57.4 42.9 38.5 17.0 18.5 7.0 4 16 10.0 100.00
98 2 2 63.9 46.4 8.0 2.0 63.7 41.7 38.8 17.3 19.7 6.0 4 16 10.0 100.00
TRANSPORTATION
Sess He Sc Hcd Scd Hsc Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Scffl Hscm Ssem (^c Cc2 Csc Csc2
87 2 2 59.7 64.7 3.0 6.0 62.2 61.9 33.5 17.0 15.0 7.0 4 16 9.0 81.00
88 2 2 59.7 70.6 3.0 4.0 61.4 68.4 33.5 17.0 14.7 9.5 4 16 7.0 49.00
89 2 2 67.2 68.6 3.0 4.0 66.7 67.5 33.5 17.5 15.0 10.0 4 16 7.0 49.00
90 2 2 56.7 64.7 3.0 4.0 56.9 65.0 33.5 17.0 17.0 10.0 4 16 7.0 49.00
91 2 2 56.3 58.8 3.0 4.0 56.9 58.4 35.5 17.0 17.0 11.1 4 16 7.0 49.00
92 2 2 60.0 55.9 2.0 6.0 59.5 56.4 40.0 17.0 18.5 9.2 4 16 8.0 64.00
93 2 2 57.6 59.4 2.0 6.0 58.3 59.3 41.3 16.0 18.0 9.0 4 16 8.0 64.00
9^+ 3 2 66.1 65.2 4.0 6.0 69.2 65.4 38.3 16.5 16.3 8.7 5 25 10.0 100.00
95 3 2 52.6 60.0 4.0 3.0 68.4 63.4 42.2 16.3 17.0 13.6 5 25 7.0 49.00
96 3 2 64.4 58.1 4.0 3.0 66.7 60.9 44.0 15.5 16.5 7.7 5 25 7.0 49.00
97 3 2 57.0 45.5 4.0 3.0 60.0 44.0 42.7 16.5 18.8 8.3 5 25 7.0 49.00
98 3 2 71.4 45.6 4.0 3.0 66.7 44.2 44.3 17.0 18.0 8.7 5 25 7.0 49.00
COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Sess He Sc Hcd Scd Hsc Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Sem Hscm Ssem Cc Cc2 Csc Cse2
87 2 2 59.4 64.7 7.5 4.0 59.0 63.9 34.5 17.0 27.1 15.7 4 16 11.5 132.25
88 2 2 59.4 67.6 8.0 4.5 58.8 69.1 34.5 17.0 25.5 15.1 4 16 12.5 156.25
89 2 2 68.1 68.8 8.0 5.0 67.5 69.3 34.5 16.0 22.6 14.8 4 16 13.0 169.00
90 2 2 56.5 64.5 10.0 6.0 56.0 62.1 34.5 15.5 28.9 14.4 4 16 16.0 256.00
91 2 2 55.6 57.1 9.0 6.5 56.0 59.8 33.8 14.0 31.5 14.6 4 16 15.5 240.25
92 2 2 62.1 56.7 8.0 8.0 62.2 56.4 36.3 15.0 34.2 14.0 4 16 16.0 256.00
93 2 2 57.3 55.6 3.0 5.0 62.2 57.6 37.5 13.5 21.0 6.6 4 16 8.0 64.00
9<+ 2 2 64.7 64.3 3.0 5.0 58.7 64.7 39.0 14.0 18.3 6.8 4 16 8.0 64.00
95 2 2 67.0 60.6 3.0 3.0 69.6 58.8 44.8 16.5 18.7 5.7 4 16 6.0 36.00
96 2 2 64.4 56.3 3.0 3.0 65.7 63.2 45.0 16.0 17.5 6.3 4 16 6.0 36.00
97 2 2 56.2 45.5 4.0 3.0 59.1 44.4 44.5 16.5 15.9 6.0 4 16 7.0 49.00
98 2 2 63.7 44.3 4.0 3.0 63.9 47.1 45.5 17.5 15.3 5.7 4 16 7.0 49.00
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TABLE 3
STRUCTURAL VARIABLES BY FUNCTIONAL AREA
SESSIONS 87-98 (CONT'D.)
HEALTH
Sess He Sc Hcd Scd Hsc Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Scffl Hsem Ssem Cc Cc" Csc Csc"
87 3 2 60.6 68.8 1.0 1.0 57.1 66.7 55.0 16.0 7.0 6.0 5 25 2.0 4.00
88 5 2 60.6 68.8 1.0 1.0 57.1 66.7 55.0 16.0 7.0 6.0 5 25 2.0 4.00
89 3 2 67.7 66.1 1.0 1.0 64.7 71.4 55.0 15.5 8.5 7.0 5 25 2.0 4.00
90 5 2 57.4 64.5 1.0 1.0 57.1 62.5 55.7 15.5 7.0 8.0 5 25 2.0 4.00
91 3 2 56.4 56.7 1.0 1.0 55.6 58.5 35.2 15.0 9.0 12.0 5 25 2.0 4.00
92 3 2 59.2 58.1 1.0 1.0 58.5 57.1 38.8 15.5 12.0 14.0 5 25 2.0 4.00
95 5 2 56.6 58.6 1.0 1.0 54.5 58.6 39.2 14.5 11.0 14.5 5 25 2.0 4.00
9<¥ 3 2 66.9 62.7 2.0 1.0 72.4 61.5 45.5 14.8 14.5 15.0 5 25 5.0 9.00
95 5 2 67.5 60.6 5.0 2.0 72.2 55.6 42.0 16.5 12.0 6.8 5 25 5.0 25.00
96 5 2 64.3 57.6 5.0 2.0 68.2 56.3 40.2 16.5 11.0 8.0 5 25 5.0 25.00
97 5 2 57.0 45.5 5.0 2.0 65.8 41.7 59.5 16.5 11.5 6.0 5 25 5.0 25.00
98 3 2 64.1 44.4 3.0 2.0 68.8 43.8 59.0 18.0 10.7 8.0 5 25 5.0 25.00
MEDICARE
Sess He Sc Hcd Scd Hsc Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Sem Hsem Sscffl Cc Cc^ Csc Csc^
87 60.0 64.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
88 60.0 64.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
89 68.0 64.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
90 60.0 64.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
91 60.0 58.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
92 60.0 56.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 55.6 25.0 16.0 0.0 9.0 2 4 1.0 1.00
93 60.0 58.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 55.6 25.0 17.0 0.0 9.0 2 4 1.0 1.00
94 67.6 61.1 1.0 1.0 69.2 63.6 57.0 18.0 15.0 11.0 2 4 2.0 4.00
95 67.6 61.1 1.0 1.0 69.2 62.5 57.0 18.0 15.0 8.0 2 4 2.0 4.00
96 66.7 60.0 1.0 1.0 66.7 57.1 56.0 20.0 9.0 7.0 2 4 2.0 4.00
97 65.7 42.9 1.0 1.0 62.5 42.9 55.0 20.0 8.0 7.0 2 4 2.0 4.00
98 65.7 45.0 1.0 1.0 62.5 42.9 35.0 20.0 8.0 7.0 2 4 2.0 4.00
SOCIAL SECURITY
Sess He Sc Hcd Scd Hsc Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Sem Hsem Ssem (:c Cc^ Csc Csc^
87 60.0 64.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
88 60.0 64.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
89 68.0 64.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
90 60.0 64.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
91 60.0 58.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
92 60.0 56.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
95 60.0 58.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2 4 0.0 0.00
9<+ 67.6 61.1 1.0 1.0 69.2 60.0 37.0 18.0 15.0 5.0 2 4 2.0 4.00
95 67.6 61.1 1.0 1.0 69.2 60.0 57.0 18.0 15.0 5.0 2 4 2.0 4.00
96 66.7 60.0 1.0 1.0 66.7 60.0 56.0 20.0 9.0 5.0 2 4 2.0 4.00
97 65.7 42.9 1.0 1.0 65.6 42.9 55.0 20.0 11.0 7.0 2 4 2.0 4.00
98 65.7 45.0 1.0 1.0 65.6 50.0 55.0 20.0 11.0 8.0 2 4 2.0 4.00
INCOME SECURITY
Sess He Sc Hcd Scd Hsc Ssc Hscd Sscd Hem Sem Hsem Ssem Cc Ce^ Csc Cse2
87 2 2 60.7 65.5 2.0 1.0 58.5 66.7 28.0 16.0 6.0 6.0 4 16 5.0 9.00
88 2 2 60.7 65.6 1.0 1.0 62.5 66.7 28.0 16.0 8.0 9.0 4 16 2.0 4.00
89 2 2 67.9 65.2 2.0 1.0 66.7 66.7 28.0 16.5 9.8 9.0 4 16 5.0 9.00
90 2 2 58.6 65.6 1.0 1.0 58.5 66.7 29.0 16.5 12.0 9.0 4 16 2.0 4.00
91 2 2 58.5 60.5 1.0 1.0 57.1 58.5 50.0 17.0 14.0 12.0 4 16 2.0 4.00
92 2 2 58.7 58.2 1.0 1.0 62.5 58.5 51.5 16.8 8.0 12.0 4 16 2.0 4.00
93 2 2 58.7 60.0 1.0 3.0 62.5 58.5 51.5 16.5 8.0 8.0 4 16 4.0 16.00
94 2 2 66.0 60.6 2.0 5.0 70.8 60.9 55.3 16.5 12.0 7.7 4 16 5.0 25.00
95 2 2 67.6 60.6 2.0 3.0 70.8 58.8 37.0 16.5 12.0 5.7 4 16 5.0 25.00
96 2 2 65.5 60.0 3.0 3.0 69.2 61.5 36.5 17.5 8.7 4.3 4 16 6.0 36.00
97 2 2 62.0 44.4 3.0 3.0 64.0 45.8 54.8 18.0 8.3 4.3 4 16 6.0 56.00




























































236. 5 77. 4 55. 8 47
98 3312. 65 8. 55 311. 5 66.5 61. 4 45
4.88% -1.16%o
Sole !: GNP is adjusted for inflation usine 1982 as the base vear. Source for GNP is
[Ref 1 1: Section 1.^] and the deflator is [Ref 12: p. 248].
.\o[e 2: The columns UNEMPLOYMENT. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS, HOUSE
DEMOCRATS, and SENATE DEMOCR.'XTES are presented as percentages.
\o[e 3: The column PRESIDENTIAL AFFILIATION is a dummy variable
assignment [0 = Republican, 1 = Democrat).
\oie 4: The colunm LAWS PASSED is the average of the two years of laws passed
daring the specified Session.
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• the number of public laws that were passed during the various sessions
[Refs. 16,17]
D. EXPECTATIONS
Each of the independent variables included in the model is expected to have an
effect on the dependent variable (°oAG^j). It is the magnitude and the direction of this
effect that is of interest, particularly in those variables which may have dual opposing
effects. The pros and cons of the specialization argument and the funding emphasis of
both parties are discussed as a generic basis for the expected directional elTect in a
number of the structural variables and in the Democratic percentage variables,
respectively.
Specialization arguments predict a reduction in expenditures as a result of better
monitoring of previous and expected funds flow. The price of information is reduced
by the value of some of the legislator's personal costs, i.e. the redirection of more of his
time, effort, and concentration to the increased detail expected of specialization. But
specialization at this level of government permits an abdication of fiscal responsibility
and accountability at lower levels; a sort of "deep pockets" spending bias results,
permeating to the lowest echelon levels. Efficiency incentives at the lower levels
disappear in a "budget for ever\'thing" frenzy. Justification perrogatives and
accountability rest with the "specialized" legislator, who has precious little more of the
mechanics of the program information than he did before. Specialization also provides
the vehicle by which increased representation of culturally distinct and geographically
dispersed constituency can effect legislation. Where no other political biases influence
selection, the highest median demander (including special interest group representation)
will gravitate to those committees and subcommittees which have the most direct effect
on their respective constituencies. Increased specialization reduces the ability of the
legislator to view his area of specialization in the context of national priorities and
Umited resources availabiUty. A strong bias to fund to get the "job" done exists because
results reflect legislative ability and encourage voter support.
Because the Democratic party tends to emphasize social programs which
encompass a number of functional areas and involve an aggregate dollar commitment
greater than programs (e.g. National Defense) favored by RepubUcans, an increase in
the percentage of democrates on committees and subcommittees will tend to be
associated with greater government expenditures.
president at the time of a vote," [Ref 15: p. 21-cl regardless of a previous or
subsequent stance taken.
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The following are the hypothesized directional efTects and associated rationale for
each of the independent variables.
%AL' (+) As unemployment increases, because of the automatic stabilizers
associated with the tax code, government revenues tend to fall and spending
to rise. This occurs without any explicit action on the part of Congress.
However, recessions also tend to trigger actions by Congress allegedly
intended to relieve unemployment. These programs represent an induced
increase in government spending.
°oAI (?) As real national income increases, reduced unemployment (i.e. lower
income security costs) and increased tax revenues (the result of increased
employment, not the tax bracket creep of inflation) increases the availability
of revenues for government spending in other areas - a positive effect. But
the reduced need for government uitervention relative to fueling the economy
and meeting income security requirements suggests reduced government
spending - a negative effect.
PA ( + ) Presidential Afliliaiion is expected to have a greater positive effect with
a Democratic president, given the predominantly Democratic control of the
Congress in most of the sessions represented in the data base, than with a
Republican president. Historically, Democratic emphasis has been on social
programs (several functional areas) while Republican emphasis has focussed
on national defense, the single largest functional area within the budget. A
Republican President's budget submission may emphasize increased spending
in the area of national defense with a measure of success, but his efforts to
reduce social spending will be largely unsuccessful in a Democratically
controlled Congress.
PS (?) The effect of an increase in the percentage of presidential victories on
congressional votes where the president tr 'k a clear-cut stand is unclear
since presidential stands could have been eitiier in favor of or opposed to the
various legislation. However, one would expect a greater percentage of
presidential stands in favor of legislation when the president is a Democrat
enjoying a Democratic majority in Congress.
L ( + ) An increase in government expenditures would tend to accompany an
increase in the number of pubhc laws passed during a session, ceteris
paribus.
He (?) As the number of House committees increases, the hypothesized increase
in government spending is potentially offset by the savings due to
specialization.
Sc (?) As the number of Senate committees increases, the hypothesized increase
in government spending is potentially offset by the savings due to
specialization.
Hsc (?) As the number oi" House subcommittees increases, the hypothesized
increase in government spending is potentially offset by the savings due to
specialization.
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Ssc (?) As the number of Senate subcommittees increases, the hypothesized
increase in government spending is potentially ofTset by the savings due to
specialization argument.
Hem (?) As the number of members of House committees increases, the
hypothesized increase in government spending is potentially offset by the
savings due to specialization.
Scm (?) As the number of members of Senate committees increases, the
hypothesized increase in government spending is potentially offset by the
savings due to specialization.
Hscm (?) As the number of members of House subcommittees increases, the
hypothesized increase in government spending is potentially offset by the
savings due to specialization.
Sscm (?) As the number of members of Senate subcommittees increases, the
hypothesized increase in government spending is potentially offset by the
savings due to specialization.
Hd ( + ) As Democratic percentages in the House increase, government
expenditures will increase.
Sd ( -I- ) As Democratic percentages in the Senate increase, government
expenditures will increase.
Hcd ( + ) As Democratic percentages in House committees increase, government
expenditures will increase.
Scd ( + ) As Democratic percentages in Senate committees increase, government
expenditures will increase.
Hscd ( + ) As Democratic percentages in House subcommittees increase,
government expenditures will increase.
Sscd (-(-) As Democratic percentages in Senate subcommittees increase,
government expenditures will increase.
E. LIMITATIONS
Because complete data were available for only 12 of the 18 functional expenditure
categories, the findings and conclusions are not as general as would have been possible
were the complete set of data used.
Because each chamber sets its structure, substructure membership, and political
make up at the beginning of each session, a number of changes occured over the
sessions. Some were merely title changes, e.g. the changes from Foreign Affairs to
International Affairs and back. Other changes evolved because of the ebb and How of
national attention and involved the establishment of new committees, e.g. the Energy
committee in both chambers, or the demise of committees, e.g. the Interior and Insular
Affairs committee in the Senate. Changes in responsibility occurred, but every effort
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was made to track responsibility for the functional areas through the various structural
changes that occurred.
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IV. REGRESSION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE REGRESSION PROGRAM
The regressions were performed using the SAS (formerly called the Statistical
Analysis System) software for data analysis. The statistical analysis procedure used is
the SAS GLM (General Linear Models) for multiple regression. The GLM results were
provided in four groupings which include:
• a general summary, which include the degrees of freedom, sum of squares (SS),
mean square, and F value.
• the Type I SS for each of the independent variables considered. The Type I SS
represents the fit of each variable within the regression in the absence of the
remaining variables.
• the Type III SS for each of the independent variables considered. The Type III
SS represents the fit of each variable within the regression after fitting all other
variables. Comparison of Type I and Type III SSs provides an indication of
correlation among the independent variables.
• the estimates and T statistics grouping for each of the independent variables.
The T statistics are the square root of the Type III F values. The T statistic
tests the hypothesis that the calculated coefficient was observed from a
distribution vvith zero correlation between the independent variable and the
dependent variable. "B" coding indicates no direct estimate of the coefficient can
be made. Estimates represent the percent change in the dependent variable per
unit change of the independent variable. Intercorrelation of the independent
variables obfuscates interpretation of the estimates except in those instances
where a comparison of Type I SS and Type III SS indicates low correlation.
Tables with regression results accompany discussions contrasting results with
expectations described in the previous chapter. The following notes accompanied each
of the regressions.
NLMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN DAT.A SET = 144
ALL DEPENDENT VARIABLES ARE CONSISTENT WITH RESPECT TO THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF
MISSING VALUES. HOWEVER, ONLY 140 OBSERVATIONS IN DATA SET CAN BE USED IN THIS ANALYSIS.
THE XX MATRIX HAS BEEN DEEMED SINGULAR AND A GENERALIZED INVERSE HAS BEEN EMPLOYED
TO SOLVE THE NORMAL EQUATIONS. THE ABOVE ESTIMAIES REPRESENT ONLY ONE OF MANY
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE NORMAL EQUATIONS. ESTl.MATES FOLLOWED BY THE LETTER B ARE
BIASED AND DO NOT ESTIMATE THE PAR.\METER BUT ARE BLUE FOR SOME LINEAR COMBINATION OF
PARA.METERS (OR ARE ZERO). THE EXPECTED VALUE OF THE BIASED ESTIMATORS MAY BE OBTAINED
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FROM THE GENERAL FORM OF ESTIMABLE FUNCTIONS. FOR THE BIASED ESTIMATORS, THE STD ERR IS
THAT OF THE BIASED ESTIMATOR AND THE T VALLE TESTS HO: E(BL\SED ESTIMATOR) = 0. ESTIMATES
NOT FOLLOWED BY THE LETTER B ARE BLUE FOR THE PARAMETER.
B. ANALYSIS OF REGRESSION RESULTS
The analysis is divided into three sections. The first is a general comparison,
while the remaining two sections focus on the individual regressions differing only
according to the manner in which the dependent variable is measured: (1) regressions
wherein the dependent variable is aggregated over all functional areas; and (2)
regressions wherein the differences in the dependent variable by functional areas are
accounted for. Functional area differences are modeled by the use of a dummy variable
(C50). Regressions were run using:
• the aggregate of the dependent variable and all independent variables (Table 5)
• the aggregate of the dependent variable and all non-partisan variables (Table 6)
• the dependent variable, with the differences of functional area accounted for,
and all independent variables (Table 7)
• the dependent variable, with the differences of functional area accounted for,
and all non-partisan variables (Table 8)
I. General Comparison
In the overall tests, SAS GLM calculates and compares a precise critical F-
value^^ with the calculated F-value for each regression. In each of these regressions,
the F-value exceeded the critical value by a significant margin. The probabilities (PR >
F) of finding F-values of this magnitude or larger in a strictly random data sample
range from 0.37 to 1.37 percent. These overall tests of the calculated F-value would
indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis, i.e. that there is zero correlation between the
aggregate independent variables and the dependent variable.
Only three of the variables had coefficients with a consistently high degree of
significance (i.e. probability less than 5 percent) such that F-values of equal or greater
magnitude would not be expected to be observed in a strictly random data sample.
These variables include: the percent change in GNP, the percent change in
unemployment, and the number of public laws passed within a given session. In every
regression, the coefficient for each of these variables was significantly different from
zero, whether the variable was fitted in the absence of any other variable or fitted after
consideration of all other variables. For each of these variables, the average of their
^SAS GLM does not provide a printout of these critical F-values. Estimates of
the F-values are 1.68, 1.82, 1.57, and 1.62 respectively.
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coefTicient estimates from all four regressions is used in discussing the elTects on
expenditures (in billions of dollars).
We can observe that a 1.0 percent increase in real national income
corresponds to an estimated 6. 88 percent increase in expenditures across functional
areas. This suggests that the pressure to reduce government spending because of
reduced need for government intervention relative to fueling the economy and meeting
income security requirements is overshadowed by the availability of increased revenues
and the desire of legislators to fund new programs and expand existing programs.
We can observe that a 1.0 percent increase in unemployment corresponds to
an estimated 1.04 percent increase in expenditures across functional areas. The estimate
effect is in agreement with our expectations. Stabilization policy appears to dictate
increases in government programs as unemployment rises. Alternatively, the automatic
stabilizing effects of the personal and corporate income taxes, combined with the
unemployment insurance system, impart a strong impact on net spending.
We can observe that every additional public law passed corresponds to an
estimated 0.16 percent increase in overall expenditures. The estimate is positive and in
agreement with our expectations, although the magnitude of the effect is ver>- small.
2. Regressions with the Dependent Variable Aggregated over all Functional Areas
a. All Independent Variables ( Table 5)
Structural, partisan, and other variables are combined in this regression to
determine the significance of each variable and the ability of the combined variables to
explain changes in the dependent variable.
.'\side from the three independent variables with statistical significance
addressed earlier. Democratic percentage in the Senate subcommittees has a calculated
F-value that is significant at the 1 percent significance level. The estimates and t-tests
suggest that for every one-unit increase in the Democratic percentage of all Senate
subcommittees addressing various legislation pertaining to a given functional area, we
would expect to see a decrease of -0.83 percent in expenditures within that functional
area. The direction of this efiect contradicts our expectation of the impact of increased
Democratic percentages in Senate subcommittees.
Although they have no statistical significance when fitted before any other
independent variable, both the percentage of Democrats in the House and the
percentage of Democrates on the House subcommittees greatly increase their F-values





Dependent Variable: CI = Percent Change Within Functional Area
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DP SQUARES SQUARE F VALUE
Mod el 19 45659.18341251 2403.11491645 2.29
Error 120 126064.66046991 1050.53883725 PR > F
Corrected Total 139 171723.84388242 0.0037
R-SQUARE C.V. ROOT MSE CI MEAN
0.2658876 192.9992 32.41201686 16.79386429
SOURCE DF TYPE I SS F VALUE PR > F
C2 "/o chg GNP 4851.04618048 4.62 0.0337
C3 *^o chg Unemployment 6386.13326950 6.08 0.0151
C4 Public Laws fL) 6402.52855626 6.09 0.0150
C5 Pres AtTiMPA) 1884.62328428 1.79 0.1830




C8 238.83324688 0.23 0.6344
C9 H Comms (He)
S Comms (Sc)
2216.09762871 2.11 0.1490
CIO 1013.87963144 0.97 0.3279
Cll Hcd 1745.35024674 1.66 0.1999
C12 Scd 374.97967148 0.36 0.5513
C13 H Subc (Hsc)
S Subc (Ssc)
492.65783165 0.47 0.4948
C14 574.46049209 0.55 0.4611
C15 Hscd 770.76390269 0.73 0.3934
C16 Sscd 7303.26081412 6.95 0.0095
C17 He Mbrs (Hm)
Sc Mbrs (Sm)
18.16512444 0.02 0.8956
CIS 3823.24127513 3.64 0.0588
C19 Hscm 3037.90291052 2.89 0.0916
C20 Sscm 1962.47015087 1.87 0.1743
SOURCE DF TYPE III SS F VALUE PR > F
C2 "o ch2 GNP 5858.98152458 5.58 0.0198
C3 •^0 ch2 Unemplovmeni 7529.04662692 7.17 0.0085
C4 Public Laws (1) 5259.83603373 5.01 0.0271
C5 Pres AffiKPA) 1522.17971640 1.45 0.2311
C6 Pres Success % (PS) 302.59608652 0.29 0.5925
C7 House Dems (Hd)
Senate Dems (Sd)
3955.35861926 3.77 0.0547
C8 929.47120716 0.88 0.3488
C9 H Comms (Tic)
S Comms (Sc)
1801.98157153 1.72 0.1928
CIO 1845.39702678 1.76 0.1876
Cll Hcd 1141.44524235 1.09 0.2993
C12 Scd 399.58696957 0.38 0.5386
C13 H Subc (Hsc)
S Subc (Ssc)
1548.60115641 1.47 0.2271
C14 1409.87908300 1.34 0.2490
C15 Hscd 4759.78940291 4.53 0.0353
C16 Sscd 8597.45280718 8.18 0.0050
C17 He Mbrs (Hem) 570,84318060 0.54 0.4625
CIS Sc Mbrs (Sem) 2830.97336624 2.69 0.1033
C19 Hscm 432.54026260 0.41 0.5223




ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (CONT'D.)
T FOR HO: PR > |T| STD ERROR
PARAMETER ESTIMATE PARAMETER = OF ESTIMATE
INTERCEPT -51.84071087 -0.64 0.5259 81.49820846
C2 7.59365857 2.36 0.0198 3.21548182
C3 1.17089798 2.68 0.0085 0.43737617
C4 0.18725530 2.24 0.0271 0.08368624
C5 17.53949417 1.20 0.2311 14.57102674
C6 -0.27027738 -0.54 0.5925 0.50359813
C7 -3.44589482 -1.94 0.0547 1.77588623
C8 1.63453583 0.94 0.3488 1.73773092
C9 11.16268559 1.31 0.1928 8.52313909
CIO -14.77737685 -1.33 0.1876 11.14957971
CIl 1.58567582 1.04 0.2993 1.52122312
Ci2 -0.95391685 -0.62 0.5386 1.54671720
C13 -1.30351431 -1.21 0.2271 1,07362365
C14 1,15613561 1.16 0.2490 0.99798474
CI5 0.62342484 2.13 0.0353 0.29288443
C16 -0.83139332 -2.86 0.0050 0.29062146
C17 -0.63209907 -0.74 0.4625 0,85749738
CIS 2.96958238 1.64 0.1033 1,80897907
CI9 0.55619514 0.64 0.5223 0.86680215
C20 2.20270037 1.37 0.1743 1.61160999
consideration of the other variables. The impact of the corresponding estimates is
unclear, because they are pertinent only when the other variables are included. The
direction of the estimate for the percentage of Democrats in the House is negative and
contradicts our expectation for this variable. The direction of the estimate for the
percentage of Democrats on the House subcommittees is positive and agrees with our
expectations.
One other independent variable is noteworthy. The Senate committee
membership variable has a large coefficient and significance levels slightly exceeding the
5 percent critical level. The decrease in F-value coupled with reduced significance levels
in Type III SSs indicates the influence of multicolinearity, such that Senate committee
membership has reduced correlative significance when fitted after all other variables.
b. All Non-partisan Variables ( Table 6)
The exclusion of partisan variables in this regression provides a more
refined look at the impact of structural variables in conjunction with the other
variables. The question addressed is: Which has the greater elfect: the number of
committees and subcommittees which address legislation, or membership changes
41
within those committees and subcommittees? No statistical significance was
generated,^** which would address this question of: Which has the greater efTect?
Aside from the three independent variables with statistical significance
addressed earlier, the independent variable, House subcommittee membership, has a
large F-value with significance levels of 6.3 percent or better. Taken in conjunction
with the estimates and t-tests, this would suggest that for each additional member on
all subcommittees in the House, we would expect to see a 1.65 percent increase in
spending in all functional areas. Stated in other terms, when every House
subcommittee which addresses legislation in a functional area experiences a
membership increase of one, we would expect to see a 1.65 percent increase in spending
in that functional area. The direction of this effect suggests that potential benefits from
specialization are offset by increased government spending that is hypothesized to
result from increased membership.
Although they have no statistical significance when fitted before any other
independent variable, the House and Senate committee variables as well as the Senate
committee membership variable have large F-values (with improved significance levels
of 6.1, 7.6, and 4.8 percent respectively) for Type HI SSs. These increased significance
levels indicate multicolinearity, such that their correlative significance with the
independent variable is much more statistically significant when fitted after all other
variables. The estimates show lower t-tests (1.79 to 2.0 percent) and significance levels
closer to the 5 percent critical level (7.66 to 4.77 percent). The effect of the estimates
(15.6 and 3.5 percent) for the variables House committees and Senate committee
membership, respectively, is positive suggesting that the impact of potential
specialization benefits is offset by the hypothesized increase in government spending
caused by increased committee review and by increased committee membership
respectively. The estimate for the variable (-19.0 percent), Senate committees, is
negative suggesting that the Senate is not yet specialized enough in the number of
committees it has reviewing legislation in the various functional areas.
3. Regressions which Account for Differences within the Dependent Variable
These regressions provide accountability for potential differences within the
dependent variable due to the twelve functional areas in its makeup.
House subcommittee membership has a greater then critical significance level





Dependent Variable: CI = Percent Change Within Functional Area
SUM OF .MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE F VALUE
Model 12 32245.58119887 2687.13176657 2.45
Error 127 139478.26268355 1098.25403688 PR >F
Corrected Total 139 171723.84388242 0.0067
R-SQUARE C.V. ROOT MSE CI MEAN
0.187776 197.3335 33.13991607 16.79386429
SOURCE DF TYPE I SS F VALUE PR > F
C2 °o chg GNP 4851.04618048 4.42 0.0376
C3 % chg L nemplovment
Public Laws (L)'
6386.13326950 5.81 0.0173
C4 6402.52855626 5.83 0.0172
C6 Pres Success %
i^!l
2812.72433183 2.56 0.1120
C9 House Conims 2160.72043880 1.97 0.1632
CIO Senate Conirns (Sc) 874.12592393 0.80 0.3740




1152.54629672 1.05 0.3076CM 336.17700850 0.31 0.5811
Ci7 ) 0.60262472 0.00 0.9813
C18 2171.67575264 1.98 0.1621
C19 Hscm 3854.44160865 3.51 0.0633
C20 Sscm 1242.85920683 1.13 0.2894
SOURCE DF TYPE III SS F VALUE PR > F
C2 % Che GNP 7824.44468972 7.12 0.0086
C3 °o ch2 Unemployment
Public Laws (L)
8739.63764036 7.96 0.0056
C4 5455.20942420 4.97 0.0276
C6 Pres Success -b (PS) 714.10642874 0.65 0.4215
C9 House Comms 3930.41834878 3.58 0.0608
CIO Senate Conims 3499.56482659 3.19 0.0766





C14 299.67211721 0.27 0.6023
C17 ) 1623.63566617 1.48 0.2263
CIS 4388.97097025 4.00 0.0477







PARAMETER ESTIMATE PARAMETER = OF ESTIMATE
INTERCEPT -130.87986385 -2. 84 0.0052 46.07580869
C2 6.38362620 2.67 0.0086 2.39161953
C3 0.92756076 2.82 0.0056 0.328811.^4
C4 0.15626445 2.23 0.0276 0.07011419
C6 0.29808235 0.81 0.4215 0.36966318
C9 15.62548168 1.89 0.0608 8.25Q72197
CIO 19.02500483 -1.79 0.0766 10.65783907
CI 3 -0.830012827 -0.78 0.4345 1.05878899
C14 0.48575218 0.52 0.6023 0.92991445
C17 -0.9553 6664 -1.22 0.2263 0.78573696
C18 3.50008376 2.00 0.0477 1.75084818
C19 1.6465:i904 2.14 0.0341 0.76870925
C20 -1.11617009 -1.06 0.2894 1.04923028
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a. AH Independent Variables ( Table 7)
Aside from the three independent variables with statistical significance
addressed earlier, the independent variable, Democratic percentage in the Senate
subcommittees, closely parallels the values and findings of Table 5. The F-value and
significance levels when fitted after all other variables are degraded, but still valid. The
elTect of the estimate remains negative as in Table 5, contradicting our expectation of
the impact of increased Democratic percentages in Senate subcommittees.
The variable. Senate committee membership, has increased F-values,
improved significance levels, and a higher estimate when compared with Table 5. The
decrease in F-value when fitted after all other variables still reflects the influence of
multicolinearity. Although a significance level still exceeds the critical 5 percent level
(5.8 percent for Type I SSs), the effect of the estimate is positive, and would suggest
that for everv' member increase on all committees in the Senate, we would expect to see
a 6.3 percent increase in expenditures over all functional areas. Stated in terms of an
increase in functional area, we would expect to see a 6.32 percent increase in billions of
dollars spent in a functional area when all Senate committees which address legislation
for that functional area experience a membership increase of one.
Of the remaining variables, only two with statistical significance show
changes when compared with Table 5. Senate committees and House subcommittees
show increased F values and high significance levels 2.6 and 6.0 percent respectively for
Type III SSs, when compared with Table 5. These variables show improved correlative
significance with the independent variable, when fitted after all other variables and
when differences by functional area are accounted for.
Although some change is experienced when the regression is run to account
for differences within the dependent variable due to the twelve functional areas,
functional area is not statistically significant (see Source code 'C50 Dummy' in Tables
7 and 8), and estimates of the coeificient for each of the functional areas are not
discussed. The only important change resulting from accounting for differences in the
dependent variable is greater F-values with improved significance levels and a larger
estimate for the independent variable. Senate committee membership.
b. All Non-partisan Variables ( Table 8)
As in Table 6, this regression disregards partisan influence in focusing on
whether membership changes or changes in the total number of committees and
subcommittees which consider legislation in a given functional area have the greater
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.Model 30 58138.14117295 1937.93803910 1.86
Error 109 113585.70270947 1042.07066706 PR > F
Corrected Total 139 171723.84388242 0.0110
R-SQUARE c.v. ROOT MSE CI MEAN
0.338556 192.2197 32.28111936 16.79386429
SOURCE DF TYPE I SS F VALUE PR > F
C2 •^o chg GNP 4851.04618048 4.66 0.0332
C3 "'o che Unemplovment 6386.13326950 6.13 0.0148
C4 Public Laws a) 6402.52855626 6.14 0.0147
C5 Pres Atril(PA) 1884.62328428 1.81 0.1815
C6 Pres Success ^o (PS) 1137.10201928 1.09 0.2985
C7 House Dems (Hd)
Senate Dems (Sd)
1425.68717595 1.37 0.2447
C8 238.83324688 0.23 0.6331
C9 II Comms (He) 2216.09762871 2.13 0.1476
CIO S Comms (Sc) 1013.87963144 0.97 0.3261
Cll Hcd 1745.35024674 1.67 0.1983
C12 Scd 374.97967148 0.36 0.5498
C13 H Subc (Tisc)
S Subc (Ssc)
492.65783165 0.47 0.4932
C14 574.46049209 0.55 0.4594
C15 Hscd 770.76390269 0.74 0.3917
C16 Sscd 7303.26081412 7.01 0.0093
CI 7 He Mbrs (Hem)
Sc Mbrs (Scm)
18.16512444 0.02 0.8952
C18 3823.24127513 3.67 0.0581
C19 Hscm 3037.90291052 2.92 0.O9O6
C20 Sscm 1962.47015087 1.88 0.1728
C50 Dummy 11 12478.95776044 1.09 0.3771
























ACCOUNTING FOR FUNCTIONAL AREA
ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (CONT'D.)
T FOR HO: PR > |T| STD ERROR
PARAMETER ESTIMATE PAR/\.\IETER = OF ESTIMATE
INTERCEPT -44.05271667 B -0.44 0.6642 101.19520438
C2 7.01467615 2.13 0.0353 3.29163697
C3 1.12877541 2.52 0.0131 0.44749957
C4 0.16354768 1.90 0.0602 0.08611308
C5 18.86836077 1.27 0.2068 14.85697602
C6 -0.35542487 -0.68 0.4987 0.52358279
C7 -3.47630612 -1.85 0.0676 1.88278310
C8 2.29404399 1.26 0.2093 1.81651829
C9 16.54082038 1.00 0.3204 16.57041541
CIO -45.84694660 -2.25 0.0263 20.35722295
Cll 1.65721458 1.03 0.3054 1.60926729
CI2 -1.42434335 -0.88 0.3785 1.61062273
C13 -3.32053712 -1.90 0.0597 1.74511519CU 2.62428423 1.27 0.2077 2.07061700
C15 0.61630775 1.42 0.1573 0.43282035
C16 -0.67398118 -2.08 0.0395 0.32336593
Ci7 -0.95393315 -0.83 0.4082 1.14904699
C18 6.31508393 2.27 0.0251 2.78113194
C19 -1.37761344 -0.96 0.3368 1.42801221
C20 3.17108351 1.76 0.0813 1.80248238
C50 1 -13.61094717 B -0.40 0.6922 34.28541338
2 -29.23995486 B -0.80 0.4273 36.69951628
3 18.32898935 B 0.74 0.4609 24.77185621
4 -6.22165837 B -0.19 0.8463 32.02773194
5 2.64716297 B 0.08 0.9355 32.65856650
6 57.27121412 B 2.41 0.0178 23.80451521
7 8.29359587 B 0.46 0.6476 18.09259823
8 45.44596978 B 2.01 0.0471 22.63224107
9 4.30179972 B 0.20 0.8453 21.99594317
10 -21.44210090 B -0.64 0.5242 33.55870437
11 -34.13892514 B -1.05 0.2939 32.36546758
12 0.00000000 B • • •
CLASS LEVELS VALUES
Dummy Vari.able: C50 12 12 3 4 5 6'' 8 9 10 11 12
edect on the dependent variable. But here, the difTerences in the dependent variable due
to functional areas are accounted for.
Aside from the three independent variables with statistical significance
addressed earlier, no other independent variable has statistical significance. Differences
in the dependent variable due to functional areas are not statistically significant. Both
of the variables. Senate committees and Senate committee members, have low
significance levels for Type I SSs, but large F-values with improved significance levels
of 0.5 and 0.85 percent respectively for Type III SSs. These variables are multicolinear,
showing improved correlative significance with the independent variable when fitted
after all other variables.
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TABLE 8
ACCOUNTING FOR FUNCTIONAL AREA
ALL NON-PARTISAN VARIABLES
Dependent Variable: CI = Percent Change Within Functional Area
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE F VALUE
Model 23 47131.58740654 2049.19945246 1.91
Error 116 124592.25647589 1074.07117652 PR >F
Corrected Total 139 171723.84388242 0.0137
R-SQUARE C.V. ROOT MSE CI MEAN
0.274462 195T488 32.77302514 16.79386429
SOURCE DF TYPE I SS F VALUE PR > F
C2 '^'o chg GNP 4851.04618048 4,52 0.0357
C3 '^0 chc Lncnipl ovment 6386.13326950 5.95 0.016^
C4 Public Laws (L)' 6402.52855626 5.96 0,0161




C9 House Conims 2160.72043880 2.01 0.1588
CIO Senate Comms 874.12592393 0.81 0.3689
C13 H Subc (Hsc) 1152.54629672 1.07 0.3024
C14 S Subc (Ssc)
He Mbrs (11cm
336.17700850 0.31 0.5769
C17 ) 0.60262472 0.00 0.9811
CIS Sc Mbrs (Scm) 2171.67575264 2.02 0.1577
C19 Hscm 3854.44160865 3,59 0.O607
C20 S'^cni 1242.85920083 1.16 0.2843
C50 Dutnmy 11 14886.00620766 1.26 0.2560
SOURCE DF TYPE III SS F VALUE PR > F
C2 % chg GNP 7379.81170503 6,87 0,0099
C3 •^0 ch5 Unempl ovment 7938.85507221 7,39 0.0076
C4 Public Laws (L
Pres Success '^ o




C9 House Comms 456.26211728 0.42 0.5158
CIO Senate Comnis 8815.45782158 8.21 (j.0050
CI 3 H Subc (Hsc) 3295. 2S^M 7940 3.07 0,os25
C14 S Subc (Ssc)
He Mbrs (Hem
931,48711027 0.87 0.3537
CI 7 ) 1139.19722199 1.06 0,3052
C18 Sc Mbrs (Scm) 7 703.15353787 7.17 0,0085
CI 9 Hscm 14,5656^047 0.01 0.9075
c:o Sscm 195.33553320 0.18 0.6706
C50 Dummy 11 14886.00620766 1.26 0.2560
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TABLE 8
ACCOUNTING FOR FUNCTIONAL AREA
ALL NON-PARTISAN VARIABLES (CONT'D.)
T FOR flO: PR > |T| STD ERROR
PA R.AMETER ESTIMATE PARA.METER = OF ESTI.MATE
INTERCEPT -104.21706042 B -1.51 0.1332 68.91297238
C2 6.54008227 2.62 0,0099 2.49503764
C3 0.93960116 2.72 0,0076 0.34562796
C4 0.14961316 2.06 0.0421 0.07279977
C6 0.29025490 0.74 0.4625 0.39374477
C9 10.46261164 0.65 0.5158 16.05274957
CIO -52.49325148 -2.86 0.0050 18.32304167
C13 -3.07748517 -1.75 0.0825 1.75697561
C14 1.80074620 0.93 0.3537 1.93366222
Ci7 -0.95684554 -1.03 0.3052 0.92909241
CIS 6.80086832 2.68 0.0085 2.53949066
C19 -0.14308892 -0.12 0.9075 1.22873404
C20 0.63373757 0.43 0.6706 1.48605663
C50 I -31.44945295 B -0.96 0.3383 32.70598566
2 -40.23751717 B -1.12 0.2631 35.77760292
3 5.47107592 B 0.23 0.8211 24.14162433
4 -17.45997356 B -0.56 0.5779 31.28688508
5 -9.35852952 B -0.29 0.7691 31.80821584
6 56.28293719 B 2.53 0.0126 22.21005591
7 3.54190683 B 0.21 0.8337 16.83469258
8 34.60465730 B 1.72 0.0876 20.08940349
9 11.48830864 B 0.53 0.5938 21.47830089
10 -38.87321815 B -1.28 0.2042 30.44627270
11 -50.45911582 B -1.80 0.0747 28.05988106
12 0.00000000 B
CLASS LEVELS VALUES
Dummy Var;Lable: C50 12 123456789 10 11 12
C. SUMMARY
The regressions results were compared to identify similar findings, then reviewed
separately to determine peculiarities with respect to the purpose of the regression.
In the general comparison, three independent variables, the percent change in
GNP, the percent change in unemployment, and the number of public laws passed
within a given session, were the only variables with consistently high F-values and
significance levels of 5 percent or better for all regressions. Multicolinearity was
evident as either increased or decreased F-values for Type III SSs indicated an
improved or degraded correlative significance with the dependent variable when fitted
after all other variables. Since no statistical significance resulted from accounting for
diilerences in the independent variable resulting from the twelve functional areas (see
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Source code 'C50 Dummy' in Tables 7 and 8), no estimates were generated for the
individual functional areas.
When partisan variables wero included, the variable Democratic percentage in the
Senate subcommittee had high F-values and significance levels of 5 percent or better in
both regressions. The Senate committee membership variable also had high F-values,
but with significance levels of 10 percent and better in both regressions.
When partisan variables were excluded, no variables had better than a 5 percent
significance level. The variable House subcommittee membership had high F-values
and significance levels better than 6.5 percent only when the difierences in the
dependent variable resulting from functional areas were not accounted for.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PURPOSE REVISITED
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the role of the legislative structure in
explaining the growih of federal government spending. The research addressed a
number of structurally related questions.
1. Does a change in membership or a change in the number of conmiittees and
subcommittees responsible for a specific functional area have any elTect on the
overall growth in federal expenditures?
2. Does partisanship have an elTect on spending?
3. Does increased specialization lead to greater spending or to better monitoring
of agency activities, ceteris paribus?
4. Is the net etleci of increased membership in committees and subcommittees:
a. reduced expenditures because of lower median member preferences, or
b. increased expenditures because of an improved ability to represent special
interest groups?
B. CONCLUSIONS
The overall tests of the calulated F-value (in all regressions) indicate a rejection
of the null Inpothesis.''"" .Although correlation is evident in the aggregate, it does not
support the structural hypothesies of the thesis, because both structural and non-
structural variables are included.
Three independent variables (unemployment, real national income, and public
laws passed) demonstrated consistently high F-values and significance levels of 5
percent or better over all regressions. Interpretation and discussion of the estimates for
these non-structural variables does not address the structural hypothesies of this thesis.
Non-pariisan structural variables demonstrated no statistical significance over all
of the regressions. However, when partisan variables were included, the Democratic
percentage in Senate subcommittees had very high F-values of 6.95 and 8.18 percent
with significance levels of less than 1.0 percent. The estimate for this variable is
negligable but negative (-.83 Percent), which disagrees with the expectation that
increases in Democratic percentages should yield corresponding increases in federal
expenditures. Five oi^ the six partisan variables show no statistical significance.
^•""Ihe null hypothesis states that there is zero correlation between the aggregate
of the indepenJont variables and the dependent variable.
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Consequently, with the exception of this one partisan variable, we conclude that
structural variables^ including partisan variables, Jo not play a significant role in
explaining the growth in federal spending.
Specialization, as it applies to Congressional structure, advocates increasing the
number of committees and subconinuttees, increasing their membership, and narrowing
the scope of their legislative review to improve monitoring of expenditures and agency
activities. Coninuttees, subcommittees, and members become more specialized as their
numbers increase and the scope of their legislative review narrows. The results of this
research would lead us to conclude that specialization does not provide better monitoring
of agency activities andfederal spending, nor does it lead to increased expenditures.
The portion of the results that addresses membership issues was equally void of
statistical significance. Consequently, we can conclude that increases in membership
have no significant effect on expenditures. The question of whether lower median
member preferences reduce expenditures or are offset by the increased membership's
ability to represent special interest groups is not answerable given the resuUs of this
analysis.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The research successfully points out the statistical insignificance of the role of the
legislative structure, including partisanship, in explaining the growth of federal
government spending. Further research in this regard, e.g. inclusion of the six
functional expenditure areas not included in this research, is not recommended other
than to substantiate these findings.
The chapter on literature review introduced some observations which could
provide interesting related research areas. For example, a member's procedural
expertise and budgetary perspective could be considered by comparison of various
chairmanships' individual legislative records, i.e. bills introduced and passed as well as
their associated expenditure levels. Research questions to be addressed could include:
• Does procedural expertise significantly inOuence the passage of bills introduced
by a member?
• If a member's political career is measured in part by the size of the expenditures
associated with the legislation which he has introduced, is there a relationship
between the power of the committee or subcommittee which he chairs and the
size of the expenditures associated with legislation which he introduced? A
related question has to do with the relationship of the time required to achieve
appointment to chairmanship from freshman year with the dollar value of
expenditures associated with introduced legislation.
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Another example might be to focus on the influence of party leadership in partisan
voting. This could be approached in two ways. The first method could compare
passage and dollar value of introduced legislation with a member's partisan voting
record. The second method could compare the power of chairmanships and partisan
voting records among members with chairmanships. The second method could also
look at the timeframes from freshman year to chairmanship in relation to partisanship
voting records.
Regardless of the area or manner, further research is essential to identify aspects
of the political process which have statistically significant bias toward high expenditure
growth. Identification of these aspects is a prerequisite for generating adequate means
to control expenditure growth.
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